Zimbabwe Post Election Violence : Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry 2018

Zimbabwe held its national elections on 30 July 2018. The electoral process was generally peaceful until 1 August 2018, when demonstrators took to the streets of Harare demanding the immediate release of the presidential election results. Arguably, the police failed to contain the situation and sought the assistance of the military which fired live ammunition to unarmed civilians. By end of 1 August 2018, at least six (6) people had been tragically killed; injury of thirty-five (35), and extensive damage and destruction of property had been caused. Following these incidents, on 12 September 2018, the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, His Excellency Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, appointed a Commission of Inquiry in terms of Section 2(1) of the Commission of Inquiry Act [Chapter 10:07] through Proclamation 6of 2018 published in Statutory Instrument 181 of 2018, to investigate matters of public welfare arising out of the tragic events in Harare on 1 August 2018. This article argues that the Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry was biased against main opposition. The article concluded that the coverage of the public hearings was polarized and that Zimbabwe is a divided and polarized state. This article contributes towards policy and reform changes.

In November 2017, Robert Mugabe was forced to resign from the presidency after a military intervention coined "Operation Restore Order" (see Mungwari, 2017  Emmerson Mnangagwa, who took over the Presidency from Mugabe, was Mugabe's henchman and has been accused by some sections of the media as being the mastermind of most of the atrocities that happened under the Mugabe regime (VOA, 2017, News Day, 2017. After being sworn in as president however, Emmerson Mnangagwa called all Zimbabweans to embrace a new era, let bygones be bygones and forget the past, and he declared Zimbabwe 'Open for Business'; a mantra criticized by many (see  article titled: 'Post Mugabe coup: Mnangagwa administration challenges'). After decades of being in isolation, Zimbabwe sought re-engagement with the west. Indeed, western observers were called in to observe the 2018 Zimbabwe harmonized elections (Mungwari, 2019). The President promised a free and fair, credible and violent free election. However, political events after elections show that Mnangagwa government has become worse than Mugabe era of civilian murders, brutal torture, rape, harassment and arrests with impunity of perpetrators in the name of the military, police, and state intelligence and ZANU PF youths.
The new President promised a new style of government and sought re-engagement with Western countries. Indeed, Mnangagwa preached peace and promised a violent free election. Western countries saw the upcoming 2018 election as a key measure of the government's will to uphold human rights and put a free, fair, credible and violent free election as the ticket to re-engagement. Thus, the 2018 Zimbabwe harmonized election on 30 July attracted a lot of media attention, locally, regionally and internationally (ZADHR, 2018).
However, Lawson (1993) defines a political regime as the formal and informal organisation of the center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not. According to Kitschelt's (1992) conceptualization, political regimes are rules and basic political resource allocations according to which actors exercise authority by imposing and enforcing collective decisions on a bounded constituency. Based on these characteristics, a regime change is defined as 'a change in (or abandonment of) the principles and norms governing the nature of a regime (Lawson, 1993: 186). Regime change is not change of characters. On this basis there is no second republic in Zimbabwe regime change. I have argued elsewhere that what changed in Zimbabwe after 2017 coup was change in person (Mugabe); not in ZANU PF cult, culture and administration. Critics argue that although Mugabe was a dictator, the new president is worse.
The Zimbabwean harmonized 2018 polls were the first election in almost 20 years without the fierce rivals Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai on the ballot paper.
The pre-election period was relatively violent free, with few cases of voter intimidation and intra-party violence from both the opposition and the ruling party recorded. The opposition held several demonstrations against the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (Zec), again, these were violent free, with the police maintaining peace during the demonstrations and not violently dispersing demonstrations as what happened during the Mugabe era.
On voting day, voting proceeded peacefully, no cases of violence were recorded. However, on 1 August 2018, opposition supporters expressed growing impatience over the slow release of the historic presidential election results, and they took to the streets, alleging that their vote was being 'stolen'. What started as a peaceful protest quickly turned violent, with opposition supporters allegedly burning cars and buses belonging to ZANU PF (Motlanthe report, 2018).
After the anti-riot police realized they 'could not contain the protestors', the army was called in to assist, but there was disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force by both the army and police. According to ZADHR (2018) report, 'within a few minutes of the army's deployment, Harare's Central Business District (CBD) resembled a warzone, with army vehicles and helicopters patrolling the city, and soldiers opening live ammunition to the fleeing protestors' (P.7).
This resulted in the death of at least six (6) civilians and a lot more were injured. In the following days the army carried out a crackdown in Harare's highdensity suburbs that included beatings (assaults) and harassment of people. In other rural areas such as Muzarabani, Mutoko and Maramba-Pfungwe (ZANU PF strongholds), oppositions supporters and party polling agents were displaced from their homes after being threatened with torture or death, or both (ZADHR, 2018).
After the local and international community expressed concern to Mnangagwa government over the preceding events, the president later assembled a Commission of Inquiry to investigate what really happened. This article attempts to analyze the Commission of Inquiry's public hearings and then examine the final report which was published. This paper analyses the state-controlled daily, The Herald and privately owned daily, News Day to ascertain how the two newspapers framed the events. The article also examined public reports such as the ZADHR, video footage and photographs as well as the Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry's final report. The writer also gained insights from attending public hearings in Harare only. The article concludes that Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry was largely biased against the main opposition MDC -Alliance. The Zimbabwean society is polarised as reflected in the media reports including social media. The article contributes towards policy changes in government and political parties which should work towards National Peace, Healing and Reconciliation so that there is closure of past violent wounds.

Commission of Inquiry Terms of Reference:
By the end of 1 August 2018, six (6) people had been tragically killed, several others injured, and extensive damage and destruction of property had been caused. On 12 September 2018, following these events, the President of Republic of

Analysis of Mnangagwa's Commission of Inquiry:
The Commission of Inquiry into 1 August 2018 Post-Election Violence was not a fair platform from the beginning and the opposition had previously expressed its concerns. Its composition and terms of reference were serious points of concern (Magaisa, 2018).
The commission was appointed by an interested party because as president at the relevant time, President Mnangagwa would have been responsible for the deployment of troops during the protests on 1 August 2018 (as the final report confirms). There were also conflicted members on account of their political affiliation and previous statements regarding the incidents under investigation. Finally, the terms of reference were too limited and appeared to have a bias towards finding fault with the opposition (again, the final report confirms these positions).
The local members of the commission were contentious choices. One is openly partisan and at least two were conflicted given their interests in the parties or matters which were under investigation. Professor Charity Manyeruke is a well-known supporter of ZANU PF and President Mnangagwa. Magaisa (2018) argues that Manyeruke makes no effort to hide her partisan views. She has been cheer-leading Mnangagwa and ZANU PF on both social and public media and has been highly critical of the MDC Alliance and Nelson Chamisa. The conflict of interest is beyond question. Arguably, Manyeruke was involved in Mugabe era violence The law under which the Commission is appointed provides that one of its duties is "to make a full, faithful and impartial inquiry into matters [under investigation]…" How does one who is so openly partisan towards the appointing authority make a "full, faithful and impartial inquiry" into any matter in which they have been already pre-judged and demonstrated partisanship (Magaisa, 2018)?
This article demonstrates the flaws of these members under 'Public hearings' section later.

Analysis of Terms of Reference:
The terms of reference are designed in a manner which steers the commission towards investigating "post-election violence" but make no specific reference to the reason purportedly begins the establishment of the commission which is the killing of civilians. Not once does the statement mention the killing of civilians, which prompted the call for the investigation. Instead, the terms of reference contain a presumption that the appropriateness of the force used must be measured against the "ensuring threat to public safety, law and order".
A key term that is missing from the terms of reference is for the commission to investigate and establish the military chain of command in order to identify who gave the authority for the deployment of soldiers and the order to shoot to kill. Although the final report's findings and Annexure 7 show the full record of these procedures followed with letters to confirm the above, it was necessary to include a specific terms of reference on this.
Finally, the commission's remit seems limited to what happened on 1 August 2018. This is clearly inadequate given that numerous witnesses and reports chronicled assaults and harassment of civilians in urban residential areas including rural areas days after 1 August. Although the government and military denied involvement or responsibility, these incidences were widely covered by both local and international media. They should have been part of the commission's specific remit. However, the commission used the wide latitude on paragraph (g) to investigate the violence against civilians after 1 August 2018, in both urban and rural areas. This was captured in the final report.

Framing of Commission of Inquiry:
The work of the Commission took almost two and half months, commencing from September 2018 to December 2018. Diverse narratives were ventilated during public hearings and other platforms. The media was granted full access to the Commission's proceedings although on the first day of public hearings, police initially barred private journalists from the venue. It is against this context that this section analyses press representation of the Commission of Inquiry activities from October to December 2018.
Important to point out is that Zimbabwe is a divided and polarized state. The country has two 'truths'; one told by ZANU PF and another told by MDC Alliance. The press depicts the two divergent dichotomy views reflecting polarization of the media.
A narrative that had been promoted through state media was that opposition leaders had incited protestors to go into the streets and that this was The study of the 'unsaid' is more revealing than the said. News Day of 18 October, 2018 carried a story titled: "Killer soldiers 'were driven by cruelty'". This article notes that nearly all stories by privately owned press were accompanied by photography of a member of the army in kneeling position shooting into fleeing citizens. The story chronicles of Silvia Maphosa aged 53, who was shot in heart despite her pleading with the soldier to let her go. "… but he still fired and killed her. It was just purely out of cruelty, she was shot by a cruel person''. According to News Day (ibid) Maphosa's sister, Miriam Chidamba, narrated that after her sister was dead, there was an attempt by doctors at Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals to cover up by producing a death certificate which listed the cause of death as stab wounds. She said: The doctor was not acting professionally. He was getting instructions from higher offices and when the family challenged the entry on the death certificate, with the help of Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR). The doctor then changed the death certificate and entered that she had been killed owing to a gunshot wound (News Day, 18 October, 2018).
News Day of 16 November, 2018 published an article with a heading: "Doctors nail army in killings". Zimbabwe's military was responsible for the fatal shooting of six civilians, some of whom had nothing to do with post-election protests. ZADHR report titled: 'Zimbabwe a New Era/Error', complied by medical doctors Norman Matara and Fortune Nyamande, documents cases the group attended to between August 1 and September 5, including 72 cases of politically-motivated violence. The report said it had attended to 11 people with gapping gun-shot wounds and accused government of a cover-up job while in one case the feared Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) tried to interfere with medical work.
A male (41) who was shot in the chest by soldiers and died on the spot…He was certified dead by a ZADHR doctor at Parirenyatwa Hospital. However, when the doctor tried to examine the body to ascertain the full nature of the injuries, he was stopped by a suspected state agent and the body was whisked away. Post-mortem results could not be obtained (ZADHR, 2018:14).
According to the report, most of those who were shot had wounds indicating they were fleeing. Reports by medical personnel indicated that most of the entry gunshot wounds and exit wounds of victims were consistent with those individuals shot whilst fleeing (ZADHR, 2018). We wish to announce that the Commission will today (yesterday), the 19 th of October 2018,adjourns its hearings in Harare, thereafter we will conduct hearings on the 20 th and 27 th of October, 2018 in Bulawayo and Gweru respectively. The commission plans to visit Mutare and to continue with the public hearings in Harare from the10 th of November, 2018. We will be hearing especially from the army and the police then (The Herald, 20 October 2018).
His Excellency, Motlanthe reiterated that they would be impartial in carrying out their mandate.
We were sworn in on the day of 19 September, 2018 and we subscribed to the oath that each and every one of us will faithfully, fully, impartially and to the best of our ability discharge the trust and perform the duties to the best of our abilities. We therefore want to assure the citizens of Zimbabwe that we will carry out the inquiry in terms of the law (The Herald, 20 October 2018).
Before the adjournment, the Commission had also heard testimonies from various people on the events that occurred on the fateful 1 August 2018. The public media, particularly The Herald (and ZBC) leaned more in favour of the ruling ZANU PF whilst independent media was heavily tilted in favour of MDC Alliance. Reconciliation is a concept that falls under peace building discourse, which refers to a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace in times of democratic transition or gross human rights violation. Lederach (1997:26) argues that reconciliation is a peace building process that assists conflicting groups in engaging with each other as humans-in-relationship. This is based on the view that when community members have a positive working relationship, they are likely to seek nonviolent means to resolve any dispute that arise among them. Karen Brouneus (2003:20) defines reconciliation as 'a societal process that involves the mutual acknowledgement of past sufferings and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships towards sustainable peace'. These processes can be official (government sanctioned), for example the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, or unofficial (community-based), for example the magama spirits rituals in Mozambique. "I did not know that soldiers were in town by the time they deployed. I only heard gunshots…I then learnt that soldiers were on the ground and that they were shooting" [Albert Ncube quoted by News Day (ibid)]. Ncube said that under POSA, any member of the army deployed upon request was supposed to report to the police commanders first and operate under their orders, but this did not happen in this case. The Police Commissioner-General, Godwin Matanga also collaborated Ncube's account, arguing they had to cut corners and deploy the military without the knowledge of the regulating authority because there was no time to follow procedures.

Various scholars who have written about
However, Matanga absolved the soldiers from having shot at the protestors, saying instead, the six people confirmed by autopsy to have died from gunshot wounds consistent with AK-47 assault rifle bullets could have been shot by the military wing of the MDC. Sibanda also said the MDC's youth wing, the Vanguard, could have been behind the shootings because State security intelligence pointed to the fact that they have arms (this exposes state security vigilance).

Matanga told the Commission that it was President
To demonstrate the fact that State media leaned on ZANU PF, The Herald of 13 November carried a story with a headline titled: 'ZD denies shooting civilians'. Appearing before the Commission, the tactical commander of the National Reaction Force, who was also Presidential Guard Commander, Brigadier-General Anselem Sanyatwa testified that the ZDF did not kill any civilian on 1 August 2018. The state controlled press' propaganda narrative stated "…during an operation aimed at restoring order in Harare's CBD". Asked about a picture that trended on social media of a kneeling soldier firing at protestors, Sanyatwa's response was "… He took that position because he was avoiding missiles that were being thrown at him…" This was a reckless and insensitive lie considering the loss of life and injuries.
On the contrary, Motlanthe report reiterated that "The Commission has not received any concrete evidence that any persons other than the Army and the Police used guns during the protests on the 1 st of August 2018" (p.40).

MDC Alliance leadership testimonies
The Commission presented an opportunity for the opposition to articulate its position on elections and political violence and to counter the narrative that had been promoted by the state that its leaders had incited violence. This was an opportunity for the opposition to articulate its own narrative of political violence and place it on the record. It was apt for the opposition to give a voice to victims of violence over the years, because that history of political violence provides a good context for understanding what transpired on 1 August 2018 (Magaisa, 2018).
The opposition's leadership took the position that they would not volunteer to appear before the Commission. However, the game changed when the Commission summoned them by way of invitation.
Motlanthe (2018) report said "Having heard extensive evidence on the MDC Alliance's role in the 1 st of August 2018 protests, the Commission In his submissions to the Commission, Chamisa categorically denied that the MDC Alliance played a role in the 1 st of August 2018 protests. He said that the MDC Alliance leadership never gave any instructions for the demonstrations to take place on the 1 st of August 2018, adding that his Party could not have organised protests because it believed it had already won the presidency and had no cause to engage in protest action.
On the allegations of inciting violence, Chamisa's position was that none of his political statements during campaign rallies amounted to incitement. He suggested that the protests were organised by ZANU PF (Motlanthe report (2018).
Tendai Biti's evidence was to the same effect: that the MDC Alliance and its supporters had always been the victims of political violence at the hand of the State. He outlined to the Commission a long history of political violence in Zimbabwe (Motlanthe report, 2018:21).
The article argues that both Nelson Chamisa and Tendai Biti delivered eloquent, powerful and compelling testimonies. In the end, the Commission asked for recommendations from the two opposition leaders. What had appeared to be hostile territory was turned into friendly ground, where mutual respect was evident (Magaisa, 2018). Biti was the first to give his testimony. He was calm, composed and erudite as he delivered his testimony. Detractors expected Biti to be emotional, aggressive and brash. Instead, he was humble, calm and respectful. Detractors expected Biti the politician to turn up. Instead, it was Biti the advocate who turned up. He commanded the stage, knew when to pause for effect, to let the message sink and when to resume. He was respectful and recognized the authority of the commission, even though he disagreed with its composition and terms of reference.
Biti went on for a long time. His purpose was simple he wanted the commissioners to get a full picture of the history of political violence in Zimbabwe. That context, he said, was relevant to understand the events of 1 August 2018. He argued that this was a violent state. It has always been violent from day one. Violence was there at the founding of the colonial state and throughout the colonial experience, during the liberation war and it continued after independence (Magaisa, 2018).
Biti's historical testimony was convenient because is gave the Commission and the watching world a fuller and clearer picture that 1 August 2018 cannot be viewed in isolation, that the state is institutionally violent and what happened cannot be divorced from this history of state impurity (as evidenced by the Army and Police senior officials testimonies of denial in the shooting of civilians).
The strategy was to remind the world that ZANU PF is violent party. "We are the victims," Biti reiterated with emphasis, as he chronicled the periods of extreme political violence unleashed by ZANU PF including Gukurahundi and the 2008 election violence. He took his time to re-count specific cases of political violence. Biti argued that ZANU PF is not only a violent party but that perpetrators have never been prosecuted. He painted a picture of impunity that leads to state agents and ZANU PF supporters violating people's rights because they are always protected.
When Chamisa came to deliver his testimony, he was also respectful yet firm.
Biti poked Madhuku's conscience, tactfully reminding him that he too was a victim of violent state. Chamisa and Biti recognized that the Commission was a political opportunity to articulate the views of the opposition. It is not often that the opposition gets a public stage which is covered both locally and internationally. There had been a lot of attention on the Commission and its proceedings had been broadcast live on national television and also other broadcasters on the internet. It was their chance to showcase the opposition as a party of substance, contrary to the caricature that is often presented on captured national television.
This article argues that the public hearings which were beamed live on various digital platforms, including ZBC-TV, enabled people to be actively involved through social media discussions. This was refreshing development because people wanted to know the reason behind demonstrations and the shootings. Relatives of the deceased and the nation at large longed for closure to the tragic violent incident. Zimbabwe also wants to move on and resolve other critical challenges such as the economy.
From the testimonies offered before the Commission, it was clear that individuals who testified perceived it was popularity contested, dominated by a "them" and "us" attitude.
People who testified should have understood that six people needlessly lost their lives, and many others were injured. Their families lost breadwinners, fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, cousins, uncles, aunts, among others. And Zimbabwe lost citizens.

Motlanthe report: Analysis of Findings & Recommendations
The much anticipated report of the Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry into the August 1, 2018 post election violence was finally released to the public. It is commendable that President Emmerson Mnangagwa stuck to his promises to release the report. Given the experience with the Chihambakwe and Dumbutsvena Commissions' reports which were never released to the public domain, there were some reasonably placed fears that the government would not honour its word to release the report. This doubt was also triggered by The Herald of 3 December 2018 story titled 'Aug 1 report for ED's eyes only' in which Presidential spokesperson , George Charamba stressed that '… there was nothing that obligated the President to share the report with anyone or not to do so if he so wished…' The true test is what the government will do with this report particularly the recommendations. It should be borne in mind that a commission plays an advisory role of sorts to the President. It is a recognized tool for Presidential decision making on matters that are complex and are in the public/national interest.
The report itself is a mixed bag with some damning findings against the Army and the Police on the one hand, and the MDC Alliance on the other. It also, unsurprisingly, is a ball of contradictions making it difficult to make sense of what the final report is all about, but much of it is a repetition or attempt to explain the unexplainable.
Finding 1: 'The MDC Alliance incited, pre-planned and well organised the demonstrations'. Rather absurdly, the Commission starts its report on the premise that the MDC Alliance was responsible for the violent demonstrations and instead of determining which other parties/ individuals or factors may have led to the violent protests , the Commission readily assumes that it is the MDC Alliance alone that is to blame. The Commission cites two speeches by Nelson Chamisa and Tendai Biti as the basis of incitement and pre-planned protest. While the commission refer to some incidents where inflammatory comments were made by some members of ZANU PF such as Josiah Hungwe and Terrence Mukupe, it quickly counters those claims either by indicating that the individuals were reprimanded by the government or that the person alleged to have made the statement, refuted the claims (which were never made available into the public domain). Already, the report takes a seemingly anti-MDC position which is consistent throughout the report.
Findings 2: "The President deployed the army" There was finally consensus that the President authorized the deployment of the army in terms of Section 213 (2) (b). The Commission bases this on two aspects: the confirmation by the Attorney General that the army could only be lawfully deployed by the President and the confirmation by the Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces that the then 'Minister of Defence', sought authorization from the President to deploy the army. Though there are clumsy attempts by the Commission to reconcile Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Section213 of the Constitution, the report squarely places like authorization of the deployment on the President, as required by the Constitution. This is a rather interesting change of Findings 3: "The death and injuries arose from the actions of the military and police". This is an obvious yet welcome concession by the Commission in that it has officially discredited the views of the ZDF and some sectors of government that previously tried to blame the MDC Alliance for the loss of life and injuries sustained. The state controlled media as used as a mouth piece to project the anti-MDC Alliance narrative: What will become clear, however, is that despite this finding, the remedial action suggested hardly corresponds to the gravity of the actions of the army. This is a fatal move by the Commission which will make it harder to sanitize and accept its findings.

Recommendations by the Commission
The recommendations are perhaps the most disappointing part of the report. Most the recommendations are compensatory in nature or adding new thing to the existing terrain. The Commission, for instance, suggests that parties adhere to the electoral code, but this is already a requirement. The Commission further suggests that parties should be registered, which is already a requirement.
However, the Commission recommendation on Nation Building and Reconciliation is significant. That there is need for National Healing as heightened by the continued reference especially in Bulawayo and Gweru to events such as Gukurahundi; as well as 2007 violence among others.

The dilemma of moving forward
The testimonies provided to the Commission of Inquiry clearly showed a divided nation which cannot see one thing and reach to the same conclusion. The testimonies further showed that the lack of nationhood in Zimbabwe is far from ethnic but largely political. The commission chairperson, Motlanthe, in a post hearings interview commented that, "we believe what we saw is that Zimbabweans want dialogue and they were talking to each other through the commission." Indeed, the commission hearings became a ventilating platform where different political views were aired without limitation. Witnesses went to far lengths to disprove "opponents' views" and propagate their own. In the end, what was clear was the fact that Zimbabwe is at crossroads, Vis avis the national question: Whither Zimbabwe? The

Conclusion
The article concludes that the death of at least six civilians and injury of many others of the postelection violence of 1 August 2018, was regarded as being unprecedented in the history of elections in There is at present a very worrisome degree of polarisation and bitterness within the body politic of Zimbabwe. The Commission of Inquiry into the August 1, 2018 post-election violence has a significant bearing on the future of Zimbabwe. It signifies a possible beginning to economic revival; nation building, healing and reconciliation based on the critical finding that Zimbabwe is a divided state, lacks common purpose and is highly polarized. The national question confronts the country, and there is no better time to ignite the process towards responding. The article also concludes that the media in Zimbabwe is polarized as demonstrated by the manner they framed events. It should be pointed out that state controlled media and the judiciaries are some of the institutions which are captured by the ruling party. Security sector reform must define the new administration's intention to reform and democratize the state. The Commission of Inquiry is an important first step as it has exposed the entrenchment of the military in the politics of the country. Zimbabwe is a 'bleeding' nation that requires peace, unity, reconciliation and healing; once these processes are done in earnest there could be closure of many hurts and wounds. The point of departure could be genuine national dialogue between ZANU PF and MDC Alliance; though efforts to engage each other appear elusive.